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Abstract-The rapid proliferation of wireless networks and 
mobile computing applications has changed thelandscape of 
network security. The recent denial of service attacks on major 
Internet sites have shown us, no open computer network is 
immunefrom intrusions. The wireless ad-hoc network is 
particularly vulnerable due to its featuresof open medium, 
dynamic changing topology, cooperative algorithms, lack of 
centralizedmonitoring and management point, and lack of a 
clear line of defense. The traditionalway of protecting networks 
with firewalls and encryption software is no longer 
sufficientand effective. Many intrusion detection techniques 
have been developed on fixed wirednetworks but have been 
turned to be inapplicable in this new environment. We need 
tosearch for new architecture and mechanisms to protect 
wireless networks and mobilecomputing application. In this 
paper, we examine the vulnerabilities of wireless networksand 
say that we must include intrusion detection in the security 
architecture for mobilecomputing environment. We have 
showed such architecture and evaluated keymechanisms in this 
architecture such as applying mobile agents to intrusion 
detection,anomaly detection and misuse detection for mobile 
ad-hoc networks.  
Keywords-Intrusion, firewall, Adhoc networks, Route 
Discovery and Route maintenance. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
n the last three years, the networking revolution has 
finallycome of age. More than ever before, we see that the 
Internet is changing computing, aswe know it. The 
possibilities and opportunities are limitless; unfortunately, 
so too are therisks and chances of malicious intrusions. It is 
very important that the securitymechanisms of a system are 
designed so as to prevent unauthorized access to 
systemresources and data. However, completely preventing 
breaches of security appear, atpresent, unrealistic. We can, 
however, try to detect these intrusion attempts so that 
actionmay be taken to repair the damage later. This field of 
research is called IntrusionDetection. 
 
A. Computer Security And Its Role 
 
One broad definition of a secure computer system is given 
by Garfinkel and Spafford asone that can be depended upon 
to behave as it is expected to. It is always a point of benefit 
to integrate security with dependability and how to obtain a 
dependable computing. system. Dependability is the 
trustworthiness of a system and    can be seen as the quality  
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of  the service  a  system offers.Integrating security and 
dependability can be done in various ways. One approach is  
to treat security as one characteristic of dependability on the 
same level as availability, reliability and safety. 
A narrower definition of security is the possibility for a 
system to protect objects with respect to confidentiality, 
authentication, integrity and non-repudiation. 
 
B. Threats Of Security 
 
Threats can be seen as potential violations of security and 
existbecause of vulnerabilities, i.e. weakness, in a system. 
There are two basic types ofthreats: accidental threats and 
intentional threats. 
i. Accidental Threat 
 
An accidental threat can be manifested and the result is 
eitheran exposure of confidential information or cause of an 
illegal system state to occur i.e.modification of an object. 
Exposures can emerge from both hardware and 
softwarefailures as well as from user and operational 
mistakes thus resulting in the violation ofconfidentiality. It 
can also be manifested as modification of an object, which is 
theviolation of object integrity. An object here can be both 
information and resource. 
 
ii. Intentional Threat 
 
An intentional threat is an action performed by an entity 
withthe intention to violate security. Examples of attacks are 
interruption, modification,interception and fabrication of 
data. 
 
C. Vulnerabilities Of Mobile Wireless Networks 
 
The nature of mobile computing environment makes it very 
vulnerable to an adversary’smalicious attacks. 
Firstly, the use of wireless links renders the network 
susceptible to attacks rangingfrom passive eavesdropping to 
active interfering as attacks on these links can from 
anydirection and target at any node. This means that a 
wireless ad-hoc network will not have A clear line of 
defense, and every node has to be prepared for encounters 
with anadversary directly or indirectly. 
Secondly, mobile nodes are autonomous units that are 
capable of roaming independently.Since tracking down a 
particular mobile node in a global scale network cannot be 
doneeasily, attacks by compromised node from within the 
network are more damaging andharder to detect. 
Third, decision-making in mobile computing environment is 
sometimes decentralized andsome wireless 
networkalgorithms rely on the cooperative participation of 
all nodes andthe infrastructure. Furthermore, mobile 
I 
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computing has introduced new type ofcomputational and 
communication activities that seldom appear in fixed or 
wiredenvironment. Applications and services in a mobile 
wireless network can be a weak linkas well. 
 
D. Need For Intrusion Detection 
 
A computer system should provide confidentiality, integrity 
and assurance against denialof service. However, due to 
increased connectivity (especially on the Internet), and the 
vast spectrum of financial possibilities that are opening up, 
more and more systems aresubject to attack by intruders. 
These subversion attempts try to exploit flaws in 
theoperating system as well as in application programs and 
have resulted in spectacular  incidents like the Internet 
Worm incident of 1988. 
There are two ways to handle subversion attempts. One way 
is to prevent subversionitself by building a completely 
secure system. We could, for example, require all users to 
identify and authenticate themselves; we could protect data 
by various cryptographicmethods and very tight access 
control mechanisms. 
The history of security research has taught us a valuable 
lesson – no matter how manyintrusion prevention measures 
are inserted in a network, there are always some weaklinks 
that one could exploit to break in. We thus see that we are 
stuck with systems thathave vulnerabilities for a while to 
come. If there are attacks on a system, we would like 
todetect them as soon as possible (preferably in real-time) 
and take appropriate action. This isessentially what an 
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) does. An IDS does not 
usuallytake preventive measures when an attack is detected; 
it is a reactive rather than pro-activeagent. It plays the role 
of an informant rather than a police officer. 
 
II. BACKGROUND ON INTRUSION DETECTION 
 
In the last three years, the networking revolution has finally 
come of age. More than ever before, we see that the Internet 
is changing computing, as we know it. The possibilities and 
opportunities are limitless; unfortunately, so too are the risks 
and chances of malicious intrusions. 
It is very important that the security mechanisms of a system 
are designed so as toprevent unauthorized access to system 
resources and data. However, completelypreventing 
breaches of security appear, at present, unrealistic. We can, 
however, try todetect these intrusion attempts so that action 
may be taken to repair the damage later.This field of 
research is called Intrusion Detection 
A simple firewall can no longer provide enough security as 
in the past. Today'scorporations are drafting intricate 
security policies whose enforcement requires the use 
ofmultiple systems, both proactive and reactive (and often 
multi-layered and highlyredundant). The premise behind 
intrusion detection systems is simple: Deploy a set ofagents 
to inspect network traffic and look for the ―signatures‖ of 
known network attacks. 
However, the evolution of network computing and the 
awesome availability of theInternet have complicated this 
concept somewhat. With the advent of Distributed Denialof 
Service (DDOS) attacks, which are often launched from 
hundreds of separate sources,the traffic source no longer 
provides reliable temporal clues that an attack is in 
progress.Worse yet, the task of responding to such attacks is 
further complicated by the diversityof the source systems, 
and especially by the geographically distributed nature of 
mostattacks. 
Intrusion detection techniques while often regarded as 
grossly experimental, the field ofintrusion detection has 
matured a great deal to the point where it has secured a 
space inthe network defense landscape alongside firewalls 
and virus protection systems. Whilethe actual 
implementations tend to be fairly complex, and often 
proprietary, the conceptbehind intrusion detection is a 
surprisingly simple one: Inspect all network activity (both 
inbound and outbound) and identify suspicious patterns that 
could be evidence ofA network or system attack. 
 
A. Classification Of Intrusion Detection Systems 
 
Intrusions can be divided into 6main types 
 
i. Attempted break-ins, which are detected by 
atypical behavior profiles or violations ofsecurity 
constraints. 
ii. Masquerade attacks, which are detected by atypical 
behavior profiles or violations ofsecurity 
constraints. 
iii. Penetration of the security control system, which 
are detected by monitoring forspecific patterns of 
activity. 
iv. Leakage, which is detected by atypical use of 
system resources. 
v. Denial of service, which is detected by atypical use 
of system resources. 
vi. Malicious use, which is detected by atypical 
behavior profiles, violations of securityconstraints, 
or use of special privileges. 
 
We can divide the techniques of intrusion detection into two 
main types. 
 
B. Anomaly Detection 
 
Anomaly detection techniques assume that all 
intrusiveactivities are necessarily anomalous. This means 
that if we could establish a "normalactivity profile" for a 
system, we could, in theory, flag all system states varying 
from theestablished profile by statistically significant 
amounts as intrusion attempts. However, ifwe consider that 
the set of intrusive activities only intersects the set of 
anomalousactivities instead of being exactly the same, we 
find a couple of interesting possibilities:(1) Anomalous 
activities that are not intrusive are flagged as intrusive. (2) 
Intrusiveactivities that are not anomalous result in false 
negatives (events are  
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not flagged intrusive,though they actually are). This is a 
dangerous problem, and is far more serious than theproblem 
of false positives. 
The main issues in anomaly detection systems thus become 
the selection of thresholdlevels so that neither of the above 2 
problems is unreasonably magnified, and theselection of 
features to monitor. Anomaly detection systems are also 
computationallyexpensive because of the overhead of 
keeping track of, and possibly updating severalsystem 
profile metrics. Some systems based on this technique are 
discussed in Section 4while a block diagram of a typical 
anomaly detection system is shown in Figure below 
. 
 
 
C. Misuse Detection 
 
The concept behind misuse detection schemes is that there 
areways to represent attacks in the form of a pattern or a 
signature so that even variations ofthe same attack can be 
detected. This means that these systems are not unlike virus 
detection systems -- they can detect many or all known 
attack patterns, but they are oflittle use for as yet unknown 
attack methods. An interesting point to note is that anomaly 
detection systems try to detect the complement of "bad" 
behavior. Misuse detectionsystems try to recognize known 
"bad" behavior. The main issues in misuse detectionsystems 
are how to write a signature that encompasses all possible 
variations of thepertinent attack, and how to write signatures 
that do not also match non-intrusive activity.A block 
diagram of a typical misuse detection system is shown in 
Figure below. 
 
 
 
D. Network Based Intrusion Detection 
 
The most obvious location for an intrusiondetection system 
is right on the segment being monitored. Network-based 
intrusiondetectors insert themselves in the network just like 
any other device, except theypromiscuously examine every 
packet they see on the wire. 
 
E. Host Based Intrusion Detection 
 
While network-based intrusion detectors arestraightforward 
to deploy and maintain, there is a whole class of attacks 
closely coupledto the target system and extremely hard to 
fingerprint. These are the ones that exploitvulnerabilities 
particular to specific operating systems and application 
suites. Only hostbasedintrusion detection systems (the ones 
running as an application on a networkconnectedhost) can 
correlate the complex array of system-specific parameters 
that makeup the signature of a well-orchestrated attack. 
 
III. ANOMALY DETECTION SYSTEMS 
 
There have been a few approaches to anomaly intrusion 
detection systems, some ofwhich are described below. 
 
A. Statistical Approaches 
 
In this method, initially, behavior profiles for subjects 
aregenerated. As the system continues running, the anomaly 
detector constantly generatesthe variance of the present 
profile from the original one. We note that, in this case, 
theremay be several measures that affect the behavior 
profile, like activity measures, CPUtime used, number of 
network connections in a time period, etc. In some systems, 
thecurrent profile and the previous profile are merged at 
intervals, but in some other systemsprofile generation is a 
one time activity. 
An open issue with statistical approaches in particular, and 
anomaly detection systems ingeneral, is the selection of 
measures to monitor. It is not known exactly what the subset 
of all possible measures that accurately predicts intrusive 
activities is. Static methods ofdetermining these measures 
are sometimes misleading because of the unique features of 
A particular system. Thus, it seems that a combination of 
static and dynamic determinationof the set of measures 
should be done. Some problems associated with this 
techniquehave been remedied by other methods, including 
the method involving Predictive PatternGeneration, which 
takes past events into account when analyzing the data. 
 
B. Predictive Pattern Generation 
 
This method of intrusion detection tries to predict future 
events based on the events that have already occurred. 
Therefore, we could have A rule E1 - E2 --> (E3 = 80%, E4 
= 15%, E5 = 5%) This would mean that given that events E1 
and E2 have occurred, with E2 occurring after E1, there is 
an 80% probability that event E3 will follow, a 15% chance 
that event E4 will follow and a 5% probability that event E5 
will follow. 
 
Problem- The problem with this is that some intrusion 
scenarios that are not described bythe rules will not be 
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flagged intrusive. Thus, if an event sequence A - B - C 
exists that isintrusive, but not listed in the rule base, it will 
be classified as unrecognized. 
Solution- The above problem can be partially solved by 
flagging any unknown events asintrusions (increasing the 
probability of false positives), or by flagging them as 
nonintrusive(thus increasing the probability of false 
negatives). In the normal case, however,an event is flagged 
intrusive if the left hand side of a rule is matched, but the 
right handside is statistically very deviant from the 
prediction. 
 
C. Neural Networks 
 
Another approach taken in intrusion detection systems is the 
useof neural networks. The idea here is to train the neural 
network to predict a user's nextaction or command, given 
the window of ‗n‘ previous actions or commands. The 
networkis trained on a set of representative user commands. 
After the training period, the networktries to match actual 
commands with the actual user profile already present in the 
net.Any incorrectly predicted events actually measure the 
deviation of the user from theestablished profile. 
 
IV. MISUSE DETECTION SYSTEMS 
 
There has been significant research in misuse detection 
systems in the recent past. Someof these systems are 
explained in depth in this section. 
 
A. Expert Systems 
 
These systems are modeled in such a way as to separate the 
rule matching phase from the action phase. The matching is 
done according to audit trail events. IDES follows a hybrid 
intrusion detection technique consisting of a misuse 
detection component as well as an anomaly detection 
component. The anomaly detector is based on the statistical 
approach, and it flags events as intrusive if they are largely 
deviant from the expected behavior. To do this, it builds 
user profiles based on many different criteria (more than 30 
criteria, including CPU and I/O usage, commands used, 
local network activity, system errors etc.). These profiles are 
updated at periodic intervals. The expert system misuse 
detection component encodes known intrusion scenarios and 
attack patterns (bugs in old versions of send mail could be 
one vulnerability). The rule database can be changed for 
different systems. 
 
B. Keystroke Monitoring 
 
This is a very simple technique that monitors keystrokes for 
attack patterns. Unfortunately the system has several defects 
features of shells like bash, ksh, andtcsh in which user 
definable aliases are present defeat the technique unless 
alias expansion and semantic analysis of the commands is 
taken up. The method alsodoes not analyze the running of a 
program, only the keystrokes. This means that A malicious 
program cannot be flagged for intrusive activities. Operating 
systems do not offer much support for keystroke capturing, 
so the keystroke monitor should have a hook that analyses 
keystrokes before sending them on to their intended 
receiver. An improvement to this would be to monitor 
system calls by application programs as well, so that an 
analysis of the program's execution is possible. 
 
C. Model Based Intrusion Detection 
 
States that are certain scenarios are inferred bycertain other 
observable activities. If these activities are monitored, it is 
possible to findintrusion attempts by looking at activities 
that infer a certain intrusion scenario. Themodel-based 
scheme consists of three important modules. The anticipator 
uses the activemodels and the scenario models to try to 
predict the next step in the scenario that isexpected to occur. 
A scenario model is a knowledge base with specifications of 
intrusionscenarios. The planner then translates this 
hypothesis into a format that shows thebehavior, as it would 
occur in the audit trail. It uses the predicted information to 
planwhat to search for next. The interpreter then searches 
for this data in the audit trail. The 
system proceeds this way, accumulating more and more 
evidence for an intrusion attemptuntil a threshold is crossed; 
at this point, it signals an intrusion attempt. 
 
V. IDS ISSUES IN MOBILE ENVIRONMENT 
 
Intrusion detection for traditional,wired networks has been 
the topic of significant research over the past few years. A 
problem arises, however, when taking the research for wired 
networks and directlyapplying it to wireless networks. Key 
assumptions are made when designing IDS s forwired 
networks, such as the difficulty for an attacker to penetrate 
the physical security ofthe system, the amount of network 
bandwidth available to the IDS, etc. Specific problemsfaced 
when building IDS for a mobile network are addressed 
below 
 
A. Lack of Physical Wires 
 
The most obvious difference when building an IDS in A 
wireless environment is the fact that an attacker no longer 
has to gain physical access tothe system in order to 
compromise the security of the network. Potentially, it is 
verysimple for someone to eavesdrop on network traffic in a 
wireless environment becausethey no longer have to break 
through any physical medium to gain access to the traffic. 
 
B. Bandwidth Issues 
 
Wireless networks have more constrained bandwidth as 
comparedto wired networks. This problem can manifest 
itself in a number of different ways whenan IDS is using 
wireless communication to convey information between 
parts of IDS onseparate nodes. An IDS in a mobile 
environment must be extremely careful to limit theamount 
of communication that takes place between nodes. A second 
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problem that maypossibly arise because of limited 
bandwidth  Is erroneous behavior of the IDS due to 
communication delay between nodes. 
 
 
C. Difficulty of Anomaly/Normality Distinction 
 
Distinguishing an anomaly fromnormalcy has always been 
somewhat difficult for wired IDS s and wireless IDS s are 
nodifferent. If nodes in a network receive false or old 
routing information from a particularnode then it is difficult 
to verify if that particular node has been compromised or 
not. Anattacker could have taken the control of the node to 
send false information to other nodesin the network, or the 
node could just be temporarily out of sync due to fast 
movement orother processing requirements. 
 
D. Secure Communication Between Ids Agents 
 
It is likely that in a wireless networkthere will have to be 
portions of the IDS running on each individual node in the 
network.Each of these IDS agents will have to communicate 
with other IDS agents in the networkto convey information 
relating to the status of the system. It is crucial that the 
informationbeing passed from agent to agent be encrypted 
as to not allow an attacker to gain accessto the 
communication. 
 
E. Lack of Centralized Access/Audit Point 
 
The lack of centralized audit points in adhoc networks 
present difficult problems for intrusion detection. Most 
static, wirednetworks have specific repositories where the 
IDS can obtain audit data for its misuse andanomaly 
detection( e.g. switches, routers, gateways, etc.). Without 
centralized auditpoints, IDS s on ad hoc networks are 
limited to use only the current traffic coming in andout of 
the node as audit data. The algorithms that the IDS uses 
must be distributed, andtake into account the fact that a node 
can only see a portion of the network traffic. 
 
F. Possibility Of A Node Being Compromised 
 
Since ad hoc networks are dynamic andnodes can move 
about freely, there is a possibility that one or more nodes 
could becaptured and compromised, especially if the 
network is in a hostile environment. 
 
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      If the 
algorithms of the IDS are cooperative, it becomes important 
to be skeptical ofwhich nodes one can trust. IDS s on ad hoc 
networks have to be weary of attacks madefrom nodes in the 
network itself, not just attacks from outside the network.
       
 
G. Difficulty In Obtaining Enough Audit Data  
 
Mobile networks do not communicateas frequently as their 
wired counterparts. Bandwidth issues, and other issues such 
asbattery life, contribute to this factor. This lack of 
communication can become a problemfor IDS s attempting 
to define rules of normality for anomaly detection. If only a 
smallamount of data is available to establish normal activity 
association rules, it is very hard todistinguish an attack from 
regular network use. 
 
VI. NEW ARCHITECTURE 
 
It is important to understand that most IDS 
architecturalmodels are based on static, wired networks. 
These models alone are insufficient to helpdesign an IDS in 
a mobile, ad hoc network environment. The architecture 
addressed is A distributed IDS, where each node on the 
network will have an IDS agent running on it.The IDS 
agents on each node in the network work together via a 
cooperative intrusiondetection algorithm to decide when and 
how the network is being attacked. Thearchitecture is 
divided into parts: the Mobile IDS Agents, which reside on 
each node inthe network, and the Stationary Secure 
Database, which contains global signatures ofknown misuse 
attacks and stores patterns of each user‘s normal activity in a 
non-hostile 
environment. 
 
A. Mobile IDS Agents 
 
Each node in the network will have an IDS agent running on 
itall times. This agent is responsible for detecting intrusions 
based on local audit data andparticipating in cooperative 
algorithms with other IDS agents to decide if the network is 
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being attacked. Each agent has five parts : the Local Audit 
Trial, the Local IntrusionDatabase ( LID ), the Secure 
Communication Module, the Anomaly Detection Modules ( 
ADM s), and the Misuse Detection Modules ( MDM s). 
i. The Local Audit Trial 
 
Each agent must constantly check the audit data to decide 
thatan intrusion is not taking place. The Local Audit Trial 
will consist of specific items out ofthe network traffic as 
well as user commands to the node. The Local Audit Trial is 
responsible for selecting only the items it needs out of the 
network traffic and systemaudit data in order to minimize 
the size of the audit data collected. A audit data iscollected 
by the Local Audit Trial, it is passed to the Misuse 
Detection Modules and theAnomaly Detection Modules for 
further analysis. The Local Audit Trial is only responsible 
for gathering and storing audit data, not processing it. 
 
ii. The Local Intrusion Database ( LID ) 
 
The LID is a local database that warehousesall information 
necessary for the IDS agent, such as the signature files of 
known attacks,the established patterns of users on the 
network, and the normal traffic flow of thenetwork. The 
Anomaly Detection Modules and Misuse Detection Modules 
communicatedirectly with the LID to determine if an 
intrusion is taking place. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii. The Secure Communication Module 
 
The Secure Communication Module is necessary to enable 
an IDS agent to communicatewith other IDS agents on other 
nodes. It will allow the MDM s and ADM s to 
usecooperative algorithms to detect intrusions. It may also 
be used to initiate a globalresponse when an IDS agent or a 
group of IDS agents detects an intrusion. Basically, 
anycommunication that needs to occur from one IDS agent 
to another will use the SecureCommunication Module.Data 
communicated via the Secure Communication Module will 
need to be encrypted inorder to ensure that the data received 
by an IDS agent is accurate and has not beentampered with.  
The Secure Communication module is only used by IDS 
agents and doesnot communicate any other type of 
information between nodes. It must share thebandwidth that 
the mobile device uses for normal data transmission, so it is 
required to beefficient, and can only use the amount of 
bandwidth in needs.Also, the Secure Communication 
module must process information coming to the IDSagent 
from other agents in the network. For this reason, it must be 
fast and efficient, so asnot to take away from the processing 
time of the mobile unit. 
 
iv. The Anomaly Detection Modules( ADM s) 
 
Each Anomaly Detection Module isresponsible for detecting 
a different type of anomaly. There can be from one to 
manyAnomaly Detection Modules on each mobile IDS 
agent, each working separately orcooperatively with other 
ADM s. For example, one ADM might be looking for 
strangenetwork traffic patterns, while another ADM might 
be watching user input speed. 
 
v. The Misuse Detection Modules ( MDM s) 
 
The Misuse Detection Modules functionssimilarly to the 
ADM s on the IDS agent. The primary difference is that 
MDM s onlyidentifies known patterns of attacks that are 
specified in the Local Intrusion Database.Like the ADM s, if 
the audit data available locally is enough to determine if an 
intrusion istaking place, the proper response can be initiated. 
It is also possible for a MDM to use A cooperative 
algorithm to identify an intrusion. 
 
B. Stationary Secure Database 
 
The Stationary Secure Database ( SSD ) in this architecture 
acts as a secure, trusted repository for mobile nodes to 
obtain information about the latest misuse signatures and to 
find the latest patterns of normal user activity. It is assumed 
that the attacker will not compromise the Stationary Secure 
Database, as it stored in area of high security. To ensure that 
the SSD will not be compromised it is kept stationary and 
not placed in a hostile environment where attacker attack is 
likely. It is also assumed that no physically compromised 
node will come in contact with the SSD,since the attacker 
will not be given physical access to the area where the SSD 
resides.Although these are severe restrictions, they can be 
accommodated through operational procedures and physical 
security.The mobile IDS agents will collect and store audit 
data while in the field, and will transfer this information 
when it is attached to the SSD. The SSD will then use this 
information for data mining of new anomaly association 
rules. The use of the SSD to mine new anomaly rules is 
beneficial to the IDS for three reasons. First, the SSD will be 
fixed, fast machine that is capable of mining rules much 
faster than on slower, mobile nodes. Secondly, the 
processing time used to mine the new rules of anomaly will 
not take away from the processing time of the mobile nodes. 
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Figure: Mobile Agents Interacting with SSD 
 
The SSD will also be the place where the system 
administrator can specify the newest misuse signatures. 
When the IDS agents are connected to SSD, they will gain 
access to the latest attack signatures automatically. This will 
make it much easier to update all the nodes in the network to 
keep up with the latest attacks. Instead of manually updating 
the attack files in the Local Intrusion Database of each 
individual node, or using the Secure Communication device 
on each node to communicate the new signatures, the SSD 
will be responsible for communicating the new attack 
signatures to each individual IDS agent. 
One of the best reasons for using the SSD to communicate 
the new attack signatures, and establish new patterns of 
normalcy, is to limit the amount of communication that must 
take place between IDS agents in the mobile ad hoc 
network. As stated earlier, the IDS agents should not use 
very much bandwidth, because it is limited and in use by 
other applications on the mobile node. The use of SSD 
allows the IDS agents to not continually have to share 
information in order to update their Local Intrusion 
Database.Communication between the SSD and the IDS 
agents will be very quick and efficient, as there should be no 
threat of attack. By relying on the SSD to be a trusted source 
of update information, the IDS agent no longer has to use 
cooperative algorithms to determine if the information being 
sent is trustworthy or not. 
 
VII. ANOMALY DETECTION IN WIRE-LESS 
AD-HOC NETWORKS 
 
In this section we discuss how to build an anomaly detection 
models for wirelessnetworks. Detection based on activities 
in different network layers may differ in theformat and the 
amount of available audit data as well as the modeling 
algorithms. 
 
 
 
A. Building An Anomaly Detection Model 
 
i. Framework 
 
The basic premise for anomaly detection is that there is 
intrinsic andobservable characteristic of normal behavior 
that is distinct from that of abnormalbehavior. Entropy and 
conditional entropy are used to describe the characteristics 
of thenormal information flows and use the classification 
algorithms to build anomalydetection models. We can use a 
classifier trained using normal data to predict whatnormally 
the next event is given the previous n events. In monitoring 
when the actualevent is not what the classifier has predicted 
there is an anomaly. When constructing A classifier features 
with high information gain are needed. 
 
Using this frame work we employ the following the 
procedure for the anomaly detection. 
a. Select or partition audit data so that the normal data 
set has low Entropy 
b. Perform appropriate data transformation according 
to entropy measures 
c. Compute classifier using training data. 
d. Apply the classifier to test it. 
e. Post process alarms to produce intrusion reports. 
 
ii. Attack Models 
 
Route logic compromise- This type of attacks behaves by 
manipulating routinginformation, either externally by 
parsing false route messages or internally by maliciously 
changing routing cache information. In particular, we 
consider several special cases: (a)misrouting: forwarding a 
packet to an incorrect node; and (b) false message 
propagation:distributing a false route update. 
Traffic pattern distortion- This type of attacks changes 
default/normal traffic behavior:(a) packet dropping; (b) 
packet generation with faked source address; (c) corruption 
onpacket contents; and (d) denial-of-service. 
 
B. Areas Where Anomaly Detection Can Be Used 
 
The two main areas where we need anomaly detection is ad-
hoc networks is 
· Abnormal Updates to the routing table. 
· Abnormal activities in other layers. 
 
i. Abnormal Updates to the routing table. 
 
The two most important factors that are required for the 
anomaly detection are Low False positive rate High true 
positive rate (percentage of anomalies detected). A routing 
table usually contains, at the minimum the next hop to each 
destination node and the number of hops. The physical 
movement of nodes or network membership changes causes 
A legitimate movement in the routing table. Our objective in 
this study is to lead a better understanding of the important 
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and challenging issues in intrusion detection for ad-hoc 
routing protocols. First using a given set of training, testing 
and evaluation scenarios, and modeling algorithms, we can 
identify which routing protocol , with potentially all its 
routing information used , can result in better performing 
detection models.This will help Answer the question ―what 
information should be included in the routing table to make 
―intrusion detection effective‖. This finding can be used in 
designing more robust protocols. 
 
ii. Abnormal Activities In other layers 
 
At the wireless application layer, the tracedata can use the 
service as the class (i.e., one class for each service), and can 
contain thefollowing features: for the past s seconds, the 
total number of requests to the sameservice, the number of 
different services requested, the average duration of the 
service,the number of nodes that requested (any) service, the 
total number of service errors, etc.A classifier on the trace 
data then describes for each service the normal behaviors of 
itsrequests. Many attacks generate different statistical 
patterns than normal requests. 
 
VIII. IMPLEMENTED APPROACHES 
 
Following are the some of the intrusion detection techniques 
used in wireless and ad hocnetworks. 
 
A. IEEE 802.11 
 
The IEEE 802.11 standard provides several mechanisms 
intended toprovide a secure operating environment. The 
IEEE 802.11 standard defines the physicallayers and the 
MAC sub layers for the wireless LANs. There are three 
different physicallayers. They are Frequency hopping 
Spread Spectrum Radio; direct sequence spreadspectrum 
Radio, and Base band infrared. The MAC layer is common 
for all these layers. 
The IEEE 802.11 defines two authentication schemes: 
i. Open System Authentication. 
ii. Shared Key Authentication. 
 
i. Open System Authentication 
 
Open system authentication is the defaultauthentication 
protocol for 802.11. As the name implies, open system 
authenticationauthenticates anyone who requests 
authentication. A terminal announces that it wishes 
toassociate with an access point, and typically the access 
point allows the association.Essentially it provides NULL 
authentication process. 
 
ii. Shared Key Authentication 
 
Shared key authentication uses a standard challenge and 
response along with a shared secret key to provide 
authentication. The shared key Authentication requires that 
the Wired Equivalent privacy protocol (WEP) Algorithm be 
implemented on both the wireless terminal and the access 
point. The station wishing to authenticate, the initiator, 
sends an authentication request management frame 
indicating that they wish to use ―shared key‖ authentication. 
The recipient of the authentication request, the responder, 
responds by sending an authentication management frame 
containing challenge text to the initiator. The challenge text 
is generated by using the WEP pseudo-random number 
generator (PRNG) with the ―shared secret‖ and a random 
initialization vector (IV)2 . Once the initiator receives the 
management frame from the responder, they copy the 
contents of the challenge text into a new management frame 
body. This new management frame body is then encrypted 
with WEP using the ―shared secret‖ along with a new IV 
selected by the initiator. The encrypted management frame 
is then sent to the responder. The responder decrypts the 
received frame and verifies that the 32-bit CRC integrity 
check value (ICV) is valid, and that the challenge text 
matches that sent in the first message. If they do, then 
authentication is successful. If the authentication is 
successful, then the initiator and the responder switch roles 
and repeat the process to ensure mutual Authentication. 
 
Figure: Mutual Station Authentication Using Shared 
Keys 
 
Mobiles that are allowed to connect to the network use the 
same shared key, so thisauthentication method is only able 
to verify if the particular mobile belongs to the 
groupallowed to connect to the network, but there is no way 
to distinguish one mobile fromanother. Also there are no 
means available to authenticate the network. The IEEE 
802.11does not define any key management functions. The 
IEEE 802.11 defines an optionalWEP mechanism to 
implement the confidentiality and integrity of the traffic in 
thenetwork. WEP is used at the station-to-station level and 
does not offer any end-to-endsecurity. Using, say, the 
playback attack, could easily fool the Shared Key 
Authenticationscheme. Hence, anyway an additional 
authentication mechanism is needed. 
 
iii. Secure Key Generation And Distribution 
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The mobile systems have constraints like minimal 
computational capabilities andauthentication and the Secure 
key generation and distribution capability is required byany 
system, which contains cryptographic authentication, 
confidentiality andidentification. Developing faster and 
more powerful hardware components, which requireless 
Energy and changing the algorithmic and protocol design of 
the current systemwould be useful to meet the future needs. 
 
iv. Current Approaches For The Key Generation 
 
a. Key generation by the telephone manufacturer and 
distribution to the Service Provider via a backbone 
network 
 
This requires the manufacturers and Serviceprovider to 
develop a special distribution channel. (b) Security of keys 
should be ensuredfrom the time the keys are sent to the 
Service provider. from the manufacturer. (c) Thisapproach is 
unacceptable to both the Service provider and the 
manufacturer. 
 
b. Over-The-Air Phone Activation With Key  
Exchange 
 
Over-the-air phone is themost preferred approach and 
requires a collaborative key generation and 
distributionbetween the mobile unit and the Service 
provider. The current over-the-air serviceprovisioning 
(OTASP) uses the Diffie-Hellman key exchange between 
the Serviceprovider and mobile unit to exchange a 
symmetric key called A-key (AuthenticationKey). 
 
IX. CONCLUSION 
 
The diligent management of network security is essential to 
the operation of networks, regardless of whether they have 
segments or not. It is important to note that absolute security 
is an abstract concept – it does not exist anywhere. All 
networks are vulnerable to insider or outsider attacks, and 
eavesdropping. No one wants to risk having the data 
exposed to the casual observer or open malicious 
mischief.Regardless of whether the network is wired or 
wirelesses, steps can and should always be taken to preserve 
network security and integrity. 
We have said that any secure network will have 
vulnerabilities that an adversary could exploit. This is 
especially true for wireless ad-hoc networks. Intrusion 
Detection can compliment intrusion prevention techniques 
(such as encryption, authentication, secure MAC, secure 
routing, etc.) to improve the network security. However new 
techniques must be developed to make intrusion detection 
work better for the wireless networks. We have shown that 
an architecture for better intrusion detection in wireless 
networks should be distributed and cooperative by applying 
Mobile Agents to the network and given few of the 
implemented approaches for intrusion detection. Currently, 
the research is taking place in developing new architecture 
for wireless networks for better security. 
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